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ABSTRACT 
 
Benjamin Midas: Nationalist Rhetoric and Public Legitimacy in Ilham Aliyev’s Azerbaijan 
(Under the Direction of Erica Johnson) 
 This thesis explores the question of why nondemocratic leaders use nationalist rhetoric 
in ways very similar to democratic leaders through a case study of Azerbaijan.  I argue that 
Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev uses nationalist rhetoric in order to build public legitimacy 
for his regime.  Despite not needing to build a base of support for legitimate elections, Aliyev 
needs to legitimate his regime in the eyes of his citizens.  To do so he uses nationalist themes in 
his speeches that resonate with Azerbaijani population to develop popular support.  These themes 
come from applying theories of nationalism to the context of Azerbaijan.  I will show the 
nationalist themes Aliyev utilizes in his speeches and how the use of those themes changes in 
response to events in Azerbaijan.  Aliyev modulates his nationalist rhetoric in response to events 
in predictable ways, which shows how he manipulates nationalist themes to generate support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Azerbaijan is a small country in the southern Caucasus ruled by President Ilham Aliyev.  
Azerbaijan was part of the Soviet Union, but became and independent country after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.  Officially, Azerbaijan has all the hallmarks of a democracy, but in practice, 
Azerbaijan functions as an authoritarian state.  Its president Ilham Aliyev is virtually guaranteed 
to win elections through rigging the system against his opposition.  Azerbaijan is an example of a 
hybrid regime, a regime that combines aspects of democratic government with more 
authoritarian principles.1  The term generally connotes a regime with very weak democracy in 
which the institutions of democracy exist but do not function properly.  Despite these 
circumstances, President Aliyev devotes a great deal of time and effort to developing nationalist 
ideology in his speeches. 
Ilham Aliyev never misses an opportunity to develop the great Azerbaijani nation.  In 
speeches, addresses, and interviews, Aliyev constantly praises the strengths of the Azerbaijani 
nation as the best, strongest, freest, etc. nation in the world.  Aliyev devotes considerable time to 
the theme of Azerbaijani’s national greatness.  At first glance, this might not seem so unusual.  
Nationalist rhetoric can be an effective tool to build support for an election.  Aliyev’s use of 
nationalist rhetoric is similar to his counterparts in western liberal democracies.  The more a 
politician can ingratiate themselves with a national group, the more they could depend on their 
                                                     
1 Larry Jay Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 21–35.; Steven 
Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 1, 
2002): 51–65. 
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group’s support in an election.  Building a base of electoral support seems like a basic 
component of the democratic system. 
Azerbaijan, as noted above, is not a true democratic system, however.  Aliyev does not 
necessarily need to mobilize a wide base of support to win elections in Azerbaijan because 
through marginalizing the opposition and possibly altering election results, Aliyev would most 
likely win the election regardless of who actually supports him.2  As in many hybrid regimes, 
democracy in Azerbaijan is a shaky proposition at best.  The regime frequently intimidates 
opposition politicians and creates a political framework in which real opposition has no chance 
of materializing and challenging the regime.  The elections are rigged and Aliyev does not 
necessarily need to spend time trying to win them legitimately.  Why then would president 
Aliyev devote time to trying to win over the public to his cause? 
 I will argue that the Aliyev regime’s stability and Aliyev’s efforts at nation building go 
hand in hand.  Creating a strong sense of nationhood in Azerbaijan helped lead to the situation in 
which Aliyev currently finds himself.  He is unquestionably a corrupt, autocratic president, but 
many Azerbaijani people approve of Aliyev and his government.  Aliyev does not need to create 
an electoral base of nationalist supporters in the sense that he needs a base to win presidential 
elections.  Nevertheless, creating such a base through his nation-building rhetoric in speeches 
helps keep his approval ratings high.  Azerbaijani citizens who approve of Aliyev, who buy into 
his proclamations on the greatness of the Azerbaijani nation are less likely to challenge Aliyev 
politically.  Aliyev does not technically need all these supporters to show up at the polls on 
                                                     
2 REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 9 October 2013 OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Mission Final Report; Warsaw December 24, 2013  
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election day and vote for him, but their support offers his regime a level of stability that is unique 
in the post-Soviet context.   
 Azerbaijan is a unique country in many ways.  It is a majority Muslim state that was once 
part of the Soviet Union.  In some ways then, its transition to a corrupt hybrid regime may not 
seem very unique at all.  Many of the post-Soviet states in Central Asia followed a similar 
trajectory after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  In many post-Soviet states, hybrid regimes 
developed when a leader with autocratic tendencies took power and refused to give it up.  What 
makes Azerbaijan unique is how stable the Aliyev regime has been, stretching back to Ilham’s 
father, Heydar Aliyev, who served as president before Ilham.  The Central Asian states witnessed 
political violence in several forms after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Even Azerbaijan’s 
neighbors in the South Caucasus experienced various levels of political upheaval.  In contrast, 
Azerbaijan has had relatively little violence since the Aliyevs came to power.3  Ilham Aliyev has 
not dealt with serious challenges to his regime in his two terms as president.  Political opposition 
exists in Azerbaijan, but it has never gathered much momentum in challenging Aliyev.  I argue 
that part of this regime stability can be explained by public support generated by Aliyev’s 
nationalist rhetoric.  
 I will use three bodies of literature to help explain why Ilham Aliyev exerts so much time 
and energy building up the Azerbaijani nation.  The first is the literature of nationalism itself.  
Many scholars have written about nation building form a variety of theoretical perspectives and 
                                                     
3 Süha Bölükbaşı, Azerbaijan : A Political History (London ; New York: Distributed in the U.S. and Canada 
exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
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about a variety of cases.4  Nation building and nationalism is an extremely important aspect of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the years following.5   I will show how Azerbaijan and 
Ilham Aliyev fit into this complex body of literature by exploring how Aliyev’s methods 
compare to other leaders’ methods of nation building.  Does Aliyev’s use of nationalism fit with 
existing explanations of nation building or are his practices unique?  Is such top-down 
nationalism common or effective?  Are there analogous examples of political stability through 
nation building or is Azerbaijan a more unique case? Nationalism is an integral part of 
understanding Ilham Aliyev’s speeches.  Aliyev uses nationalism to build solidarity in the public 
and generate legitimacy for his regime. 
 I will also use literature that explores the idea of authoritarian legitimacy.  Authoritarian 
leaders such as Ilham Aliyev are not universally reviled by their citizens.  Many are not as 
popular as Aliyev, but many do seek some kind of legitimacy through elections or other means.  
I will show how Aliyev’s efforts to build support and legitimacy through nation building rhetoric 
fit into the wider context of authoritarian legitimacy.  
 Finally, I will explore the literature on hybrid regimes.  Azerbaijan certainly fits the mold 
of a hybrid regime.  It combines aspects of both democratic and authoritarian government, most 
typically through competitive elections which are usually not free or fair.  It is important to 
understand how hybrid regimes tend to function in general and how Azerbaijan compares.  
Azerbaijan is an interesting case in terms of hybrid regimes again because of how popular and 
                                                     
4 For a broad overview of nationalism see 1. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism (Verso Books, 2006) and Ernest Gellner and John Breuilly, Nations and Nationalism 
(Cornell University Press, 2008). 
 
5 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence : Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: Norton, 2000) 
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stable the Aliyev regime has been. I argue that Aliyev uses nationalism to generate public 
legitimacy and this helps explain the stability of hybrid regimes.  
Data and Case Selection 
 Aliyev became president in 2003 after his father, Heydar Aliyev, passed the reins of 
power to him.  He won two subsequent elections and remains Azerbaijan’s president.  Heydar 
Aliyev came to power in 1993 amid the political and economic turmoil of Azerbaijan’s post-
Soviet transition.  A former Communist Party official during the Soviet era, the elder Aliyev 
promised the people of Azerbaijan stability and order.  After two terms as President and in 
failing health, Heydar appointed his son, Ilham, as his successor and stepped aside to allow his 
son to ascend to the presidency. 
 In many ways, Ilham Aliyev continued the legacy of his father.  He continued to base his 
rule on economic and political stability that Heydar Aliyev cultivated.  The younger Aliyev made 
nationalism a central theme of his regime that he utilized in all of his speeches.  He conveys a 
consistent message about the Azerbaijani nation, where it has been, where it is now, and where it 
will go in the future.  This consistent narrative serves to legitimate his place as president of 
Azerbaijan.  Only Ilham Aliyev can guide the Azerbaijani to the glorious future he so eloquently 
lays out.   
What makes Ilham Aliyev’s constant promotion of this nationalist rhetoric so interesting 
is that fact that he is doing it despite the fact that he is president of a state with dubious 
democratic credentials.  During the 2013 election in which Aliyev won his third term as 
president, election monitors pointed out a wide variety of electoral irregularities.6  These 
                                                     
6 REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 9 October 2013 OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Mission Final Report; Warsaw December 24, 2013 
6 
 
practices are consistent with our contemporary understanding of hybrid regimes.  The research 
on hybrid regimes focuses on how leaders steal elections through various means, be it through 
outright rigging the vote or by subverting the institutions of democracy to preclude serious 
opposition.  In this case, we see a leader in a hybrid regime going beyond these typical 
techniques.  While Aliyev is most likely not totally unique, his use of nationalism shows a 
method of hybrid regime rule not typically studied.  Aliyev’s speeches sound like the stump 
speeches of a candidate in a liberal Western democracy trying to court voters.  Although Aliyev 
does necessarily need the votes in the polls, clearly Aliyev is concerned with promoting his 
nationalist narrative in order to gain domestic legitimacy among the Azerbaijani population and 
legitimately gain their votes. 
To understand Ilham Aliyev’s efforts at nation building, I will utilize the practice of 
content analysis on the content of his speeches in order to detect recurring nationalist themes. 
Content analysis involves developing a method to code qualitative data to show trends in almost 
any kind of material.  The coding is dependent on the specific subject being studied and involves 
a close reading of texts to both develop the coding rules and gather the data.7 I will focus on how 
Aliyev aggrandizes the Azerbaijani nation and what kind of characteristics he imbues it with.  I 
will also try to parse how Aliyev relates his idea of the Azerbaijani nation to his people and how 
he relates it to the rest of the world.  This rhetoric about the Azerbaijani nation allows Aliyev to 
present himself as a legitimate leader despite the non-democratic nature of his regime. 
 All of Aliyev’s speeches are published online on the official website of the President of 
Azerbaijan.  This collection includes speeches to wide audiences, remarks to smaller groups of 
                                                     
7 Marilyn Domas White and Emily E. Marsh, “Content Analysis: A Flexible Methodology,” Library Trends 55, no. 
1 (2006): 22–45. 
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people, as well as statements made in a variety of state functions.  I use the English translations 
of speeches provided on the official website.  There is the possibility that these translations are 
not exactly the same as Aliyev’s speeches in Azerbaijani or that certain phrases associated with 
these themes do not translate perfectly and could be inadvertently overlooked.  While this is a 
potential weakness of this study, I believe the English translations provide compelling evidence 
of Aliyev’s use of nationalist rhetoric.   
I will focus my analysis around two events in recent Azerbaijani history, the 2012 border 
clashes with Armenia and the 2013 presidential elections.  These events will show how Aliyev 
changes the nationalist content of his speeches relative to events and his need for public support.  
The data will show that Aliyev uses nationalist rhetoric more at times when his regime needs 
legitimacy, such as an election.    
In this thesis, I ask why a leader in a hybrid regimes would develop nationalist rhetoric in 
his speeches.  Using content analysis of President Aliyev’s speeches, I demonstrate that a need 
for public support causes higher rates of nationalist themes in Aliyev’s speeches.  The next 
chapter presents a discussion of the methodology for the content analysis.  The thesis then 
continues with a literature review in which I lay out the theoretical framework of my argument 
from a variety of perspectives.  With this framework in place, I will move on to a case study of 
Azerbaijan in which I will analyze the nationalist rhetoric of Aliyev’s speeches.  I will show that 
Aliyev’s use of nation building rhetoric constitutes a unique example of a hybrid regime 
president using nationalist themes to strengthen his own legitimacy.  This will show the 
complexity of hybrid regimes that is often overlooked.  Even when elections are not free, leaders 
in hybrid regimes use this strategy, and most likely others, to gain support.  This thesis helps 
shed light on the nuances of hybrid regime leadership. 
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Methodology 
To show how Ilham Aliyev uses nationalism to gain domestic legitimacy, I focus on the content 
of his speeches.  I show how Aliyev expresses themes of nationalism, in what terms, in what contexts, 
and how often.  I focus on speeches centered around two events in Azerbaijan: (1) the outbreak of 
violence on the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2012 and (2) Aliyev’s third presidential 
election in 2013.  These two different contexts show how Aliyev uses nationalist rhetoric in response to 
different situations and they illustrate my argument that Aliyev uses such nationalist rhetoric in an attempt 
to generate genuine public support. 
 Looking at these two events, I examine speeches during a period from one month before to one 
month after the events to show trends in Aliyev’s nationalist rhetoric.  Election cycles are obviously times 
in which one would expect politicians to ramp up efforts to build support and court voters.  Aliyev is no 
different and uses nationalism to this end during election cycles regardless of the fairness of the 
impending election.  The outbreak of violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2012 represents one of 
the major recent developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh war.  The war with Armenia is one of the major 
pieces of Aliyev’s nationalist rhetoric.  Such a major event in the progress of the war provides another 
insight into how Aliyev uses nationalist themes.  At times when Aliyev needs more support, he uses more 
nationalist themes.   In total, I examine the content of 37 speeches over these two time periods. 
 To analyze Aliyev’s speeches, I use the practice of content analysis, which allows me to discover 
trends in qualitative data.8  I examine Aliyev’s speeches and code the frequency of nationalist terms and 
ideas within them.  In particular, I search for instances of six core pieces of nationalist rhetoric, inclusive 
language, shared history, positive characteristics of the Azerbaijani nation, favorable foreign 
comparisons, the legacy of Heydar Aliyev, and the threat of Armenia.  Looking at speeches across a 
duration of time and surrounding two distinct events allows me to discover trends and consistency in 
                                                     
8 Marilyn Domas White and Emily E. Marsh, “Content Analysis: A Flexible Methodology,” Library Trends 55, no. 
1 (2006): 22–45. 
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Aliyev’s usage of these terms.  I examine each speech individually and count instances of these terms to 
show that Aliyev is using these themes in order to generate public support. 
 Nationalism provides very diverse opportunities in terms of rhetoric.  One of the most important 
aspects of nationalism is the construction of in-groups and out-groups.  I find instances of this in Aliyev’s 
speeches by searching for several different specific terms.  When Aliyev refers to shared Azerbaijani 
history, he is creating a sense of inclusiveness.  He also frequently extolls the many virtues of the 
Azerbaijani nation and transfers those attributes to his audience.  He also compares Azerbaijan to foreign 
nations to highlight the superiority of Azerbaijan.  These strategies create the sense of what it means to be 
Azerbaijan and brings Aliyev’s audience into that nation.  These strategies allow Aliyev to generate 
public support by utilizing the power of nationalism to create solidarity. 
 Aliyev also uses a shared view of Azerbaijan’s history to consolidate the nation.  He focuses on 
several common themes to shape this historical narrative.  It relies heavily on a shared history of 
oppression during the Soviet period in which Azerbaijan was unable to exert her will.  Aliyev 
characterizes the immediate post-Soviet period as one of chaos and corruption.  The ascension of his 
father Ilham Aliyev to the presidency pulled Azerbaijan out of chaos and into the current period of 
stability and prosperity.  Aliyev positions himself as a continuation of his father’s positive legacy.  
Aliyev’s nationalist version of Azerbaijan’s history positions him as the capable leader of a strong 
Azerbaijani nation.  Aliyev also delineates the nation by describing those outside the nation negatively.  
He also creates external threats to the nation.  All of these strategies relate to the ongoing conflict with 
Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh.  Aliyev describes Azerbaijan’s superiority to Armenia, but also the threat 
Armenia represents to Azerbaijan.  He extends this analysis to many countries around the world.  
Contrasting other nations to Azerbaijan allows Aliyev to strengthen the solidarity of the Azerbaijani 
nation.  This solidarity leads to increased legitimacy for Aliyev’s regime because he is not just the leader 
of the Azerbaijani state, but the Azerbaijani nation as well.  
10 
 
 In analyzing Aliyev’s speeches, I count the instances of these six themes to establish trends in the 
way Aliyev uses these themes.  These ideas and terms are not concrete combinations of words that 
appear, so there is an element of discretion involved in the coding of these speeches.  My intent, however, 
is not to establish definite statistical trends in these speeches, but rather to point out more qualitative 
trends.  The exact coding of the speeches will not be completely replicable, since there will be 
interpretation of Aliyev’s meaning to some degree.  I believe the results of the coding, however, are 
persuasive in illustrating trends in Aliyev’s speeches and demonstrate the ways in which Aliyev uses 
nationalism to gain public support.   
By analyzing speeches surrounding the violence in 2012 and the election in 2013, the data show 
that Aliyev’s use of these nationalist themes changes in predictable ways.  After the violence between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan started in 2012, Aliyev needed to rally support, and we see an increase in the 
nationalist rhetoric after the violence began.  Around the 2013 election, one would expect high levels of 
nationalism in speeches before the election to generate support for his presidency and tapering to low 
levels after the election when public support is less necessary.  The data presented in the case study 
chapter show that Aliyev’s speeches match these expectations. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
I examine why a non-democratic leader in a hybrid regime, such as Ilham Aliyev in 
Azerbaijan, would devote time and effort to developing nationalist rhetoric.  A hybrid regime is a 
regime that combine aspects of both democracy and authoritarian rule and much of the current 
research focuses on the authoritarian aspects of these regimes.  I argue that leaders in hybrid 
regimes must do more than simply coerce voters through force and strengthen a base of cronies, 
they must also “court the voters” even though these elections may be unfair.  I argue that 
nationalism is a tool that leaders of hybrid regime use to gain domestic legitimacy and this 
process is often overlooked in literature on hybrid regimes.   
Through a case study of the hybrid regime Azerbaijan and its president, Ilham Aliyev.  I 
show that Ilham Aliyev manipulates ideas of nationalism in his speeches in order to gain the 
support of Azerbaijani citizens without recourse to force.  Nationalism is a powerful force in the 
post-Soviet context that creates solidarity among a group of people based on nationality, or their 
notion of a shared history and similarity.9 Aliyev uses his speeches as a platform to construct a 
specific narrative of Azerbaijan.  His nationalist vision of the past, present, and future serves as a 
legitimating principle of his regime.  He can modulate the nationalist rhetoric in his speeches in 
reaction to situations in which he and his regime require stronger legitimacy. 
                                                     
9 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence : Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: Norton, 2000). 
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By reaching out to voters through nationalist rhetoric, Aliyev creates a base of legitimate 
support in the population.  In developing this argument, I rely primarily on three bodies of 
literature, that of hybrid regimes, authoritarian legitimacy, and nationalism.  The literature of 
hybrid regimes will show that Azerbaijan does conform to the characteristics of hybrid regimes, 
but this question is insufficiently explained by simply theories about hybrid regimes.  Hybrid 
regime literature focus on the structure and organization of these regimes.  It focuses on how 
elites interact with opposition and how institutions function.  In terms of elections, much of this 
literature focuses on how the regime rigs elections and protects itself from losing power.  
Azerbaijan fits into this mold, but Aliyev’s manipulation of nationalism goes beyond the 
treatment elections receive.  
The literature of authoritarian legitimacy explores the ways in which nondemocratic 
regimes generate legitimacy and why legitimacy is important in these regimes.  This literature 
shows how nondemocratic regimes build legitimacy.  It is based on the idea that nondemocratic 
regimes are concerned with more than just rigging elections or ruling through non-democratic 
practices.  Despite convention wisdom, authoritarian regimes employ a range of strategies to 
engender legitimate public support.  I will use this literature to show how and why a leader in an 
authoritarian and/or hybrid regime might employ strategies to secure domestic legitimacy. 
Finally, I will use literature on nationalism to show how the practices and mechanics of 
nationalism can contribute to legitimacy in hybrid regimes such as Azerbaijan.  Much of the 
broader literature on authoritarian legitimacy focuses on populism as a way non-democratic 
regimes generate legitimacy.  Nationalism is another strategy that can build legitimacy.  This 
literature will show how significant a force nationalism can be.  I will use it to the ways in which 
a non-democratic leader such as Aliyev could use it to build legitimacy. 
13 
 
In the following paragraphs I will show how each of these bodies of literature relates to 
my argument.  I start with hybrid regimes, then the literature of authoritarian legitimacy, and 
finally the literature of nationalism.  After examining the relevant aspects of each, I will pull 
these threads together to provide the conceptual background of my argument. 
Hybrid Regimes 
 The literature of hybrid regimes focuses on regimes that do not fit neatly into the 
categories of democracy or autocracy, instead these regimes mix elements of both to varying 
degrees.  Some regimes are more democratic and some more authoritarian.10  These types of 
regimes proliferated in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.  As dozens of states started 
to transition from communist rule, political scientists and other observers struggled to accurately 
categorize what they saw.11  Many of these regimes espoused democratic rhetoric and established 
democratic institutions, but also exhibited authoritarian tendencies.  I will show how several of 
these theories describe hybrid regimes and how it relates to the use of nationalist rhetoric in 
attempts to gain regime legitimacy in Azerbaijan. 
 Mikael Wigell argues that typical definitions of hybrid regimes oversimplify the 
phenomenon and miss the nuance that makes such regimes so distinctive.12  He gives an 
                                                     
10 For a broader overview of the research on hybrid regimes see Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Rise of 
Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 1, 2002): 51–65,; Jason Brownlee, “Portents 
of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions,” American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 
3; and Larry Jay Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002) 
 
11 Valerie J Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, “DEFEATING DICTATORS: Electoral Change and Stability in 
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,” World Politics 62, no. 1 (2010): 43–86.; Daniela Donno, “Elections and 
Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 3 (2013): 703–16.; 
Joakim Ekman, “Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes,” 
International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique 30, no. 1 (2009): 7–31. 
 
12 Mikael Wigell, “Mapping ‘Hybrid Regimes’: Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative Politics,” 
Democratization 15, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 230–50. 
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overview of previous conceptions of hybrid regimes based on a regime’s democraticness.  Most 
of these conceptions suggest that a regime is either democratic or it is not.  Wigell argues that 
such a conceptual framework misses the nuance of hybrid regimes entirely because it cannot 
capture the difference between two regimes that are both semi-democratic in the sense that they 
contain different blends of democratic and authoritarian elements. 
 Instead, Wigell offers a slightly different conception of liberal democracy that is based on 
two dimensions, electoralism and constitutionalism.  Electoralism is a mechanism that makes 
governments responsive to the demands of the people, while constitutionalism places limits on 
the power of that government.  By mapping regimes along two spectrums, Wigell creates a much 
more nuanced conception of regime types.  He offers four types that vary in their levels of both 
electoralism and constitutionalism: democratic, constitutional-oligarchic, electoral-autocratic, 
and authoritarian.  A constitutional-oligarchic regime, for example, consists of unelected leaders 
working with a strong constitutional framework, while an electoral-autocratic regime contains an 
elected leader with few limits on his power.  This nuanced view allows one to place regimes with 
varying levels of democratic institutions into different conceptual categories.  This increased 
specificity allows us to look at Azerbaijan and its regime without trying to describe it in simply 
democratic or authoritarian terms, which gives more space for analysis of how the regime 
functions. 
 Matthijs Bogaards also offers a more nuanced view of hybrid regimes.13  Bogaards points 
to a similar problem as Wigell in the conceptualization of hybrid regimes.  Previous theories are 
vague, Bogaards argues, because they rely on rooting the regime in either democracy or 
                                                     
13 Matthijs Bogaards, “How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism,” 
Democratization 16, no. 2 (April 1, 2009). 
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authoritarianism, but, crucially, it is one or the other, never both.  In other words, Bogaards 
explains, a regime may be a flawed type of democracy or a flawed authoritarian regime.  Such a 
conception also fails to capture nuance and is not very useful when comparing regimes. 
 Bogaards also points out that this framework rests on the idea that regimes are 
transitioning and hybrid regimes are inherently unstable.  These frameworks implicitly suggest 
that hybrid regimes will eventually move to either the democratic or authoritarian side of the 
spectrum.  Rooting regimes in either democracy or authoritarianism makes sense if regimes are 
inherently moving towards one or the other, but Bogaards suggests that hybrid regimes can be 
stable.  This stability mandates a more nuanced method for categorizing and understanding 
hybrid regimes.  Regime stability makes examining Aliyev’s legitimacy building strategies 
possible because it is not assumed that his regime will eventually fail.  Instead, by arguing that 
this hybrid regime could be durable, studying the practices of the regime becomes crucial for 
understanding it. 
 Both of these conceptual frameworks help to understand Aliyev’s regime in Azerbaijan.  
The regime combines elements of both democracy and authoritarianism.  Aliyev faced 
democratic elections to retain the presidency, but those elections were fraught with practices 
more closely associated with authoritarian regimes.  As Wigell argues, this is not simply a case 
of a flawed democratic regime or a flawed authoritarian regime, it combines aspects of both in a 
unique way.  Azerbaijan appears fairly stable, as Bogaards argues, so claiming it is a 
transitioning regime is not satisfying.  It is not simply a transitory regime, but a regime with 
considerable durability. 
 Other scholars studying hybrid regimes focus on the more concrete dynamics of 
institutions and governance in hybrid regimes. Nikolay Petrov, Maria Lipman, and Henry E. 
16 
 
Hale use Russia to describe governance in a hybrid regime.14  They argue that the institutional 
makeup of hybrid regimes emerges from a series of what they call dilemmas.  They identify 
three dilemmas of elections, mass media, and the state.  A regime’s responses to these dilemmas 
shapes the authoritarian and democratic aspects of that regime.  In the case of Azerbaijan, this 
conception of dilemmas helps us understand how Aliyev’s regime approaches elections (and the 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh) in terms of their potential risks and benefits. 
 The dilemma of elections refers to the necessity of elections in hybrid regimes, but also 
their risk.  Elections serve to legitimize leaders in hybrid regimes, but also open them up to 
considerable risk because there is a chance the incumbent could lose or that the elections could 
spark revolutionary activity.  Hale, Petrov, and Lipman argue that regimes must hold elections, 
but mitigate their risks somehow.  In Azerbaijan, we can conceive of Aliyev’s nationalist rhetoric 
as one way to mitigate the risk of elections. 
Mass media behaves in a similar way, they argue. It is necessary, but opens the regime up 
to risk.  Media gives the regime a better idea of public opinion and allows it to formulate policy 
accordingly, but also opens the regime up to criticism.  As with elections, they argue, regimes 
must walk a tight rope of allowing media that is useful to the regime without allowing it to 
become damaging.   
Petrov et al’s final dilemma, the dilemma of the state, refers to how functional institutions 
are in a hybrid regime.  An example of an institution could be elections.  If elections function 
properly, that is accurately record votes and lead to a regime change accordingly, then the regime 
obviously fails.  If the regime creates effective institutions for governance, it runs the risk of 
                                                     
14 Nikolay Petrov, Maria Lipman, and Henry E. Hale, “Three Dilemmas of Hybrid Regime Governance: Russia 
from Putin to Putin,” Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 1–26. 
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diluting its own power to those institutions.  The regime must balance the existence of these 
institutions with their ability to cause the regime harm.  Weak institutions make governance the 
personal responsibility of those in charge of the regime.   
Petrov, Lipman, and Hale use three examples from Russia to illustrate these dilemmas.  
In 2005, Putin’s regime tried to reform in-kind social benefits by replacing them with cash 
payments.  In 2008, the regime prepared to build a highway through the Khimki Forest, a 
beloved national landmark.  And in 2011, the results and conduct of elections led to protesters in 
the streets.  In all three cases, regime policies met with fierce public resistance.  The regime 
responded to each crisis and dilemma and evolved into a unique constellation of democratic and 
authoritarian tendencies.  The regime still allowed elections, but made it more difficult for 
opposition candidates to run at all, lessening the chances for protests on the day of the elections.  
The regime also expanded its control of the media to quiet opposition voices.  In the case of 
Azerbaijan, we see similar tendencies, but Aliyev also uses nationalism as a tool to build a broad 
base of support.  By building this support, Aliyev lessens the chance of protests against his 
regime and the risk of a free media.  He mitigates the danger of elections by trying to create a 
base of citizens who will actually vote for him.  He uses media to expand his nationalist rhetoric 
and bases his rule and control of the state firmly in terms of Azerbaijani nationalism. 
 Thomas Sedelius and Sten Berglund used Ukraine as a case study in their work on hybrid 
regime dynamics.15  They argue that a semi-presidential system, a system with both a president 
and a parliament, in hybrid regimes exacerbates the problems of institutional conflict and 
political stalemate.  When a parliament and prime minister exist alongside a president, there is 
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conflict as all three try to maintain and grow their power.  In particular, they identify two types 
of semi-presidential systems, premier-presidential and president-parliamentary. The difference is 
based on the relative strengths of the president and the parliament.  In a president-parliamentary 
regime, the president can easily overpower the parliament, while in a premier-president system, 
the two are more equal.  Most post-Soviet states adopted some type of semi-presidential system.  
Azerbiajan fits the model of a president-parliamentary system, which in line with Sedelius and 
Berglund, gives Aliyev considerable power over politics in Azerbaijan. 
 Semi-presidentialism of either type creates institutional conflict, however.  The president, 
prime minister, and parliament all jockey for power and influence, at times to the detriment of 
substantive policy making.  Sedelius and Berglund show this to be the case in Ukraine, which 
they argue to be a premier-presidential system.  Ukraine’s post-Soviet political situation has been 
defined by conflict between its president and prime minister.  Yanukovych and Yushchenko 
before the Orange Revolution and Yushchenko and Tymoshchenko after it.  These conflicts 
stalled development of democracy in Ukraine as each tried to increase their power at the expense 
of the other.  In many ways the conflict between the president and parliament is another example 
of the dilemma of the state in a hybrid regime referenced by Petrov, Lipman, and Hale.  The 
institutional strengths of the president, prime minister, and parliament determine how the regime 
responds to challenges and shapes its democratic and authoritarian aspects. 
 This literature on hyrbrid regimes is helpful in understanding the nuances and 
institutional dynamics of Azerbaijan’s regime.  Certainly, Azerbaijan combines democratic and 
authoritarian elements in a way that fits the description of a hybrid regime.  Aliyev’s regime is 
driven by the forces described here, in short, the tension between its democratic and authoritarian 
elements.  His regime holds elections, but they are typically not very democratic.  The regime 
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exercises control over the media to keep opposition voices out and strengthen Aliyev’s 
nationalist rhetoric. 
 This body of literature is less useful for understanding the role of legitimacy in a hybrid 
regime because it focuses on how the regime rigs elections to stay in power.  Most literature of 
hybrid regime glosses over a leader’s own domestic legitimacy, which could be measured 
through their public approval, in favor of analysis of the concepts and institutions that drive 
hybrid regimes.  My argument that Ilham Aliyev uses nationalism to gain domestic legitimacy is 
based in part on the idea that Ilham Aliyev cares about his own domestic legitimacy.  Much of 
the literature of hybrid regimes seems to assume that leaders only rig elections and focus on 
keeping opposition unable to challenge them.  What is missing is how leaders might accomplish 
their goals by genuinely gaining the support of their citizens.  I turn now to the literature of state 
legitimacy in authoritarian regimes to show how significant legitimacy is even in nondemocratic 
regimes. 
Authoritarian Legitimacy 
 Eugene Huskey argues that authoritarian rulers must govern with what he calls a velvet 
fist, which refers to a combination of coercive and persuasive practices by the regime.16 The 
position of the authoritarian ruler is more complex than simply coercing its citizens with force 
and rigging elections, these rulers must make their citizens want to follow them instead of 
forcing them.  Powerful presidencies and Soviet legacies allow individuals to rule through a 
system of patronage in which personal connections to the president are very important.  Many 
presidents came to power on a surge of nationalism and solidified their positions through this 
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system of patronage.  The presence of elections and the act of winning them also legitimates 
these presidents without recourse to violence.  Rulers must strike a balance between winning the 
election and rigging it to the point of illegitimacy.  Aliyev’s nationalist rhetoric is one 
mechanism of striking this balance.  It is likely that Aliyev rigs elections in his favor, but by 
building a base of support with nationalist rhetoric, elections seem more legitimate to the 
population because they do vote for him. 
 Huskey also notes that these authoritarians typically create an ideology to legitimate their 
presidential rule and this often involves placing the person of the president above politics in 
some way.  The president acts for the good of the people, it is others who make the unpopular 
policy mistakes.  Aliyev’s nationalism could serve a similar role as an ideology.  Aliyev places 
himself above politics by creating a unique place for himself in the context of the Azerbaijani 
nation as its leader. 
 Aleksei Makarkin makes a similar argument about the role of legitimacy in an 
authoritarian or hybrid regime context.  17 Makarkin argues that the Russian regime derives its 
legitimacy from a uniquely Russian social contract.  In the Russian social contract, the 
population trades loyalty to the regime in return for stability, which Makarkin defines as mainly 
economic stability.  It is essentially populism in that the state derives its legitimacy from giving 
the population the economic benefits of a stable, growing economy. 
 Makarkin traces the roots of this populist bargain to the Soviet period.  Citizens 
acquiesced to Soviet rule because the Soviet Union provided them with a stable economy and an 
increasing standard of living.  The Soviet Union collapsed because it became unable to deliver 
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stability or growth by the end of the 1980s.  Yeltsin ultimately lost support because he too 
proved unable to provide economic stability in the 1990s.  Putin’s regime, Makarkin argues, 
remains so durable because it can uphold this social contract.  Putin is a legitimate leader 
because he provides Russian citizens with a stable economy and improves their standard of 
living.  This social contract-based legitimacy is economic in nature, not political.  In Makarkin’s 
view, Russian citizens care less about the nature of their political system than they do their 
economic prosperity, which allows many of the authoritarian aspects of Putin’s regime.  
Makarkin offers the basis for authoritarian legitimacy, but my research shows that economics are 
not the only basis of this stability.  Aliyev uses nationalism in a similar way to economics in 
Makarkin’s view. 
 I argue that there can be more to the idea of a social contract than just economic stability.   
Aliyev’s nationalism is another way of the regime giving his citizens what they want.  Aliyev 
focuses on certain issues of nationalism, specifically the conflict with Armenia, and delivers 
results on those issues, just as Makarkin argues Putin delivers economic stability.  Aliyev uses a 
similar mechanism to Makarkin’s theory, but it is framed in different terms. 
 Honorata Mazepus et al argue that such populist practices are only half the picture of 
legitimacy.18  They argue that legitimacy, which they define as citizens transferring power to the 
regime not out of fear, but out of concurrent values, relies upon the output of the state and the 
input of its citizens.  Output refers to populist economic practices noted by both Huskey and 
Makarkin, while input refers to the values of a regime’s citizens.  A regime must, they argue, 
appeal to its citizens for not only material reasons, but also in terms of their values and attitudes.  
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Legitimacy becomes not only a perception of what the regime stands for, but also an evaluation 
of the ability of the regime to benefit its citizens.  Legitimation strategies consist of rhetorical 
claims about the regime or specific actions by the regime to encourage citizens to buy into the 
regime. 
 Mazepus et al examine three hybrid regimes as cases studies for their theory of regime 
legitimacy, Russia, Venezuela, and Seychelles.  In Russia, they make a similar argument to 
Makarkin. Putin’s regime, they argue, is perceived as legitimate because it created a stable 
economic environment for its citizens.  Putin replaced communist ideology with his own 
ideology of stability and order.  Mazepus et al combine the economic aspect of the regime’s 
legitimacy with a more rhetorical form of legitimacy based on the charismatic personality of 
Putin himself.   Aliyev replaces Putin’s ideology of stability and order with his own based on 
nationalism. 
 The above concepts of legitimacy in authoritarian or hybrid regimes all focus mainly on 
economic aspects of the relationship between the regime and its citizens.  Patronage and populist 
policies serve as the driving force of legitimacy.  It is a compelling argument in its logic and 
simplicity, but it does not cover all potential sources of legitimacy.  I argue that certain kinds of 
rhetoric and ideology can also serve to legitimate the regime, such as nationalism. 
 David Lewis argues that state legitimacy in nondemocratic regimes is based on the 
regime constructing a hegemonic discourse that significant social groups, that is large groups in 
society, internalize.19 A hegemonic discourse is one that constrains the possibility of political 
alternatives.  Regime legitimacy, then, rests on the regime’s ability to promote the message that 
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it is the only game in town and make its citizens believe that.  In this framework, control over 
media is an essential aspect of regime legitimacy.  The regime must be able to promote its own 
messages to its citizens.  Aliyev promotes his nationalist rhetoric in similar ways, through his 
speeches and in the media. 
 This literature helps explain why Ilham Aliyev would care about domestic legitimacy.  
As Mazepus et al note, no regime wants to appear illegitimate.  Regardless of the degree of 
democracy in Azerbaijan, Aliyev wants his citizens to support his regime, he wants his citizens 
to view him as a legitimate leader.  The literature also provides several methods that leaders in 
hybrid regimes use to gain legitimacy, including economic patronage, populist policies, and the 
rhetoric of state strength.  Nationalism is a potential method of regime legitimation that is not 
articulated.  Nationalism can build a broad base of support without economic policies.  In the 
post-Soviet context, it has historically been a powerful force.  I argue that it remains a powerful 
potential source of nationalism. 
Nationalism 
 As Ernest Gellner argued, at its core, nationalism is a political ideology that seeks to give 
distinct nations political control over themselves, the national unit and the political unit should 
be congruent.20  Each distinct nation should govern itself and its own territory.  Who constitutes 
the nation remains a point of contention in the research of nationalism both broadly speaking and 
specifically in the post-Soviet context.  Many scholars note the power of nationalism as a 
mobilizing force both during the collapse of the Soviet Union and afterwards.  I will show how 
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nationalism both shaped and was shaped by the events following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and how it remains relevant in many post-Soviet states, including Azerbaijan. 
 In the introduction to his book From Voting to Violence: Democratization to Nationalist 
Conflict21, Jack Snyder argues that nationalism is a way to cope with the social change wrought 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union and attempted transition to democracy.  Snyder defines 
nationalism as a political ideology that says people who see themselves as distinct should rule 
themselves.   He argues that this conception of nationalism, based as it is on the perception of 
distinctiveness, allows leaders to use nationalism to come to power and remain in power.  Snyder 
also points out that nationalism is inherently a political force that has many potential outcomes.  
Self-rule, Snyder claims, does not necessarily mean democracy, just the absence of rule by an 
outside power, which could be nondemocratic.  A nationalist dictator would be better than a 
foreign president. Snyder’s basic conception of nationalism and its utility are very applicable to 
Azerbaijan.  Nationalism proved to be a powerful force near the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
Heydar Aliyev harnessed it to come to power in 1995.  Ilham Aliyev continues to lean on 
nationalism to strengthen his own regime. 
 Rudolf de Cilia et al.22 that, as imagined communities, nations are created and shaped 
discursively.  These authors define the nation in terms of Bordieu’s concept of habitus, the nation 
is a set of common ideas, attitudes, and behaviors.  The most basic concept of nationalism is that 
of the in-group and out-group.  The nation must be delineated as to who is part of it and who is 
not.  They argue that the differences between the two groups are nearly as important as the 
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similarities that bring the nation together.  This is a core component of Aliyev’s nationalism in 
Azerbaijan.  He very clearly defines the Azerbaijani nation against the out-groups of Armenia 
and other foreign enemies. 
 Rogers Brubaker argues that nationalism is central to understanding post-Soviet regimes 
and their nationalism was shaped by the institutional structure of the Soviet Union.23  Every 
nation in post-Soviet space is a product of Soviet institutions.  Soviet policy broke society up 
into national units based on republics, regions, and even towns.  These units served as the basis 
for claims of sovereignty. Brubaker argues that while the Soviet Union did repress expressions of 
nationalism, it also created a certain way of understanding the world, in that it created distinct 
groups of people based on conceived nations.  Relationships between different groups came to be 
based on the ideas of these nations being different.  Dividing the population into so many units 
and demarcating those units with territory, language, and so on, Soviet institutions created a type 
of political understanding based on the concept of the nation.  Brubaker points out that one’s 
nationality remained important throughout the Soviet period to the point of appearing on 
passports.  These institutions shaped the way Soviet citizens related to each other and the rest of 
the world, which in turn shaped nationalism in the successor states.  Soviet legacies included the 
groundwork of nationalist rhetoric and action.  Aliyev’s understanding of what constitutes the 
Azerbaijani nation comes from this Soviet legacy.  He uses the Soviet framework to describe 
who is and is not part of the Azerbaijani nation, which is one of the core concepts of his 
nationalist rhetoric. 
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 J. Paul Goode argues that nationalism became a major source of legitimacy for the 
successor regimes of the Soviet Union.24  These regimes must create an ideology that legitimizes 
the regime and their Soviet legacy allows nationalism to serve this role.  Goode argues that the 
theory that hybrid regime durability is based on elite unity ignores very important aspects of how 
post-Soviet hybrid regimes function.  Goode argues that the successor regimes needed to prove 
that they were worthy of the loyalty of their citizens.  Nationalism provided an easy method of 
building a base of support.  It also allowed regimes to attack their opposition by disparaging the 
nationalist credentials of the opposition and linking it with foreign entities.  Nationalism gives 
the regime an easy way to neuter the opposition, which shows how nationalism can be 
manipulated by leaders for specific purposes, as in Azerbaijan. 
Conclusion 
 Taken together, these bodies of literature provide a strong conceptual framework for 
analyzing state-led nationalism in Azerbaijan and specifically in the speeches of its president, 
Ilham Aliyev.  The most basic aspect of nationalism being the construction of in-groups and out-
groups.  My analysis of nationalism will start by focusing on how Aliyev constructs these 
groups, which is informed by Soviet legacies.  This involves inclusive aspects of building who is 
part of the Azerbaijani nation and what that inclusion means and exclusive aspects of who is not 
and what being outside the nation means.  This will show how nationalism can be used to create 
support for a leader by pulling members of the nation together against perceived outside dangers. 
When considering the question of the relationship between hybridity and nationalism, a 
thorough understanding of hybrid regimes, authoritarian legitimacy, and nationalism is necessary 
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as these concepts form the basis of my argument.  Ilham Aliyev manipulates nationalism as a 
method to generate domestic legitimacy, which is necessary even in nondemocratic regimes.  
Such discursive strategies of legitimation are present in other hybrid regimes and the flexibility 
and power of nationalism, especially in the post-Soviet context are well documented.  The next 
section of this thesis will analyze the content of Ilham Aliyev’s speeches to discern this 
discursive trends. 
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CASE STUDY 
To answer the question of why Ilham Aliyev devotes so much effort to developing a 
nationalist rhetoric in his speeches, I now examine the content of Aliyev’s speeches.  Using the 
practice of content analysis, I show trends in how Aliyev utilizes nationalist themes in his 
speeches.  By noting the frequency with which Aliyev references nationalist themes, I establish 
the prevalence and consistency of these themes in Aliyev’s rhetoric.  I have determined that the 
most significant nationalist themes present in Aliyev’s speeches are inclusive language, a shared 
Azerbaijani history, the positive characteristics of the Azerbaijani nation, favorable foreign 
comparisons, the legacy of Heydar Aliyev, and the threat posed by Armenia to the Azerbaijani 
nation.  I carefully analyzed 37 of Aliyev’s speeches and coded for these themes by counting 
how many times Aliyev reference them in his speeches.  In the following sections, I describe the 
theoretical roots of these themes and offer examples to show how theory translates into Aliyev’s 
speeches.  Then I will show the data on the usage of these themes in Aliyev’s speeches in 
reaction to the 2012 violence with Armenia and his 2013 presidential election.   
 Despite expectations of authoritarian regimes, Aliyev must court the population for 
genuine support.  One of the way he accomplishes this goal is through the use of nationalist 
rhetoric.  I argue that Aliyev uses nationalist themes as a legitimating principle for his regime to 
generate this support.  To show this, I analyze speeches centered around two events in 
Azerbaijan, a series of border clashes with Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2012 and Ilham 
Aliyev’s third presidential election in 2013.  These speeches will show how Aliyev manipulates 
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nationalism in response to events.  If Aliyev does use nationalist themes to gain popular support, 
one would expect to the see the content of his speeches change in response to these events.  In 
the case of the border violence, we would expect to see Aliyev use more nationalist rhetoric after 
the violence to rally support against Armenia, whereas before the violence, one would expect the 
content of his speeches to be more benign.  Similarly, one would expect more nationalist content 
in speeches before the presidential election to generate support, but less so after the election 
when it is less necessary.   
I demonstrate that this is indeed the case by showing how Aliyev’s use of nationalist 
themes changes in relation to the above events.  In the following pages I offer a brief overview of 
the history of Azerbaijan in order to establish some of the major themes on which Aliyev draws 
for his speeches.  I then elaborate on the specific nationalist themes that Aliyev uses in his 
speeches.  Then I describe how Aliyev used those themes in relation to the 2012 clashes with 
Armenia and his third presidential election in 2013.  This analysis shows how Aliyev used 
nationalism to gain support by showing the way he modulated his use of nationalist themes in 
response to significant events. 
 
Historical Context 
 
 Azerbaijan emerged as an independent country in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991.  The modern independent state of Azerbaijan came into existence like many other 
post-Soviet states in a climate of economic chaos and political instability.  The full story of 
Azerbaijan’s independence begins before 1991, however.  In 1988, amid the climate of 
Gorbachev’s glasnost, tensions between Azerbaijan and its neighbor Armenia began to increase.  
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In many ways, the tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia helped speed the centrifugal forces 
that tore the Soviet Union apart.25 
 National minorities across the Soviet Union took advantage of the relaxed political 
situation to agitate for increased autonomy and political rights.  Nationalism provided a ready-
made vehicle for political mobilization and the leaders of national republics in the Soviet Union 
took advantage.  The structure of the Soviet Union had preserved national identities through the 
promotion of national cultures and the creation of national political elites.  In the 1980s, these 
elites took advantage of the currently existing national cultures as political bases of support.  
Across the Soviet Union, movements sprang up to fight for the rights of their nationalities.26 
 The situation was no different in Azerbaijan and Armenia.  In the environment of 
glasnost, groups came into existence in both Armenia and Azerbaijan to agitate for their political 
and cultural rights.  Things quickly came to a head regarding the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.  
Nagorno-Karabakh was officially part of the Azerbaijan Republic per decisions made in the early 
Soviet period on how to divide the territory of the South Caucasus.  While officially a part of 
Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh was surrounded by Armenia territory and a majority of its 
inhabitants were Armenian.  This led to a clash between the government of Azerbaijan who 
wanted to keep Nagorno-Karabakh officially part of Azerbaijan and the inhabitants of Nagorno-
Karabakh who felt no strong connection to Azerbaijan and sought autonomy from both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan.27 
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 For a majority of the Soviet period, the region remained relatively stable and peaceful.  
Tension existed between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region, but the central Soviet 
government was able to manage the situation to keep it from exploding.  Before the 1980s and 
the loosening political climate, there was no avenue for dissent over the status of Nagorno-
Karabakh.  This meant there were no major challenges over the region.  By the 1980s, this 
ceased to be the case.  As nationalist movements in the republics gained momentum, the conflict 
in Nagorno-Karabakh became increasingly important.  Armenia wanted to protect the ethnic 
Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh and began to press for Nagorno-Karabakh to officially 
become part of Armenia. Azerbaijan wanted to maintain its territorial integrity and viewed 
Nagorno-Karabakh as an inviolable part of that territory.  Both republican governments lobbied 
the central Soviet government, which proved increasingly unable to manage the conflict.28 
 As the central Soviet government lost its ability to manage the competing claims over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, tensions rose until violence broke out.  At the time, many Azerbaijanis lived 
in Armenia and vice versa, to say nothing of the intermingling of populations in Nagorno-
Karabakh itself.  In Nagorno-Karabakh in 1979 there were 123,000 Armenians and 37,000 
Azerbaijanis.29  Escalating violence in Armenia and Azerbaijan led to ethnic minorities being 
driven out of each republic.  Fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh drove most Azerbaijanis out and 
Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself independent.  Violence continued sporadically, and the status 
of the territory remains unresolved to this day.  Both Armenia and Azerbaijan insist that 
Nagorno-Karabakh is part of their countries, while Nagorno-Karabakh itself insisted on its 
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independence.30  The proliferation of nationalist movements helped pull the Soviet Union apart 
and perhaps the most violent nationalist movements were in Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
 In Azerbaijan, the nationalist Musavat party controlled the newly independent 
government.  They   The party came to power during the collapse of the Soviet Union riding a 
wave of nationalist, anti-Soviet sentiment.  The party followed a similar path to many post-
Soviet states by liberalizing politics and the economy through transition to market principles.  
Despite the natural resource wealth of Azerbaijan, the transition to the market economy proved 
chaotic.  Many citizens faced economic hardship and corruption was rampant.  Despite the 
assumption that democracy would easily fill the void of the Soviet Union, economic instability 
reigned supreme and democratic principles were dubious at best. 
 In 1993, Heydar Aliyev, the father of Ilham Aliyev, defeated the Musavat party and 
became president of Azerbaijan.  He had been a party official in Azerbaijan in the 1970s and 
used the chaos of the 1990s to return to power.  The elder Aliyev based his rule on bringing 
economic stability to the country.  To this end, Aliyev took advantage of Azerbaijan’s natural 
resources as much as possible.  Azerbaijan had a long history of oil production and Heydar 
Aliyev sought to use its wealth of oil to boost Azerbaijan’s faltering economy.  To this end, 
Aliyev signed the “Contract of the Century” in 1994, which sought to cash in on Azerbaijan’s oil 
through cooperation with foreign companies.  The deal proved incredibly lucrative for 
Azerbaijan and gave its economy a stable base.31 
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 While Aliyev did stabilize the Azerbaijani economy through effective management of its 
natural resources, he did little to further democracy in Azerbaijan.  Aliyev adopted many 
authoritarian practices in order to stay in power in Azerbaijan.  He kept elections and other 
democratic institutions, but created a system in which it was unlikely he would ever lose an 
election.  He made it nearly impossible for any kind of political opposition to operate effectively.  
Heydar Aliyev laid the foundation for Azerbaijan becoming a hybrid regime.32 
 With his health failing, Heydar Aliyev transferred power to his son, Ilham.  This 
transition of power was unique in post-Soviet history.  Several post-Soviet leaders, such as 
Yeltsin, picked successors when they left office, but only in Azerbaijan was the successor the 
son of the current president.  It is a testament to the stability of Heydar Aliyev’s political system 
and its lack of space for opposition that his son came in as president without significant 
opposition.  In many ways, Ilham Aliyev carried on the legacy of his father.  He focused his 
efforts on maintaining economic stability in Azerbaijan and protected his own position as 
president by marginalizing dissent and tightly controlling the political process.33 
 Despite relative internal stability, Nagorno-Karabakh remained a constant problem for 
independent Azerbaijan.  Although the pro-Armenia government of Nagorno-Karabakh declared 
itself independent shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, independent Azerbaijan 
maintained that Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan.  Fighting continued off and on 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.  The OSCE created the 
Minsk group in 1992 to try to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.  The group managed to 
broker ceasefires between Armenia and Azerbaijan when violence became widespread, but the 
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parties have not been able to fully settle the conflict.  Because of its significance in Azerbaijan’s 
history in both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, both Heydar and Ilham Aliyev made 
Nagorno-Karabakh a core component of their presidencies.34 
 Aliyev first became president in 2003.  His father Heydar was president, but in failing 
health.  Ilham served in several political appointments before 2003, but as Heydar’s health 
deteriorated, he appointed Ilham prime minister, so when Heydar stepped down from the 
presidency due to his health, Ilham became president.  Opposition groups protested this transfer 
of power, but they were unable to mount significant resistance to stop it and Ilham entrenched 
himself as president.35 
 The 2013 election marked Ilham Aliyev’s third presidential election.  He won previous 
elections comfortably in results the opposition, as much as Ilham allowed them to participate at 
all, contested.  Foreign observers concluded that the elections were neither free nor fair.  The 
2013 election proved no different.  The government harassed opposition groups and made it 
difficult for them to participate in the election.  The OSCE election monitoring group in 
Azerbaijan noted many significant irregularities in the election and called the entire election 
process flawed.36  Aliyev won by a comfortable margin and began his third presidential term in 
October 2013. 
Since 2003, Ilham Aliyev continues to rule Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh continues 
to simmer.  Ilham Aliyev adopted many of the practices of his father.  He maintained a tough line 
against Armenia and focused on the economic stability of Azerbaijan as a paramount goal.  The 
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younger Aliyev also solidified Azerbaijan as a hybrid regime by undermining its democratic 
institutions but allowing those institutions to continue to exist and functioned in a weakened 
form.  Ilham also cemented the use of nationalism as a cornerstone of regime legitimacy.  I now 
elaborate on the nationalist themes commonly utilized by Ilham Aliyev before showing how he 
utilizes these themes in his speeches. 
Nationalist Themes and Analysis of Aliyev’s Speeches37 
 I analyze Ilham Aliyev’s speeches for six different nationalist themes, inclusive language, 
a shared Azerbaijani history, the positive characteristics of the Azerbaijani nation, favorable 
foreign comparisons, the legacy of Heydar Aliyev, and the threat posed by Armenia to the 
Azerbaijani nation.  These six themes came out of various theories of nationalism described in 
the earlier review of the literature and the process of analyzing Aliyev’s speeches.  In order to 
analyze these themes, I examined 37 speeches and tallied the number of times Aliyev referenced 
these themes to illuminate trends in his rhetoric.  In the following sections I describe the 
theoretical roots of these themes and offer examples to show how theory translates into Aliyev’s 
speeches. 
   When examining Aliyev’s speeches, I focused on speeches centered around two specific 
events.  This allows me to show how Aliyev’s uses of nationalist rhetoric changes in response to 
different events, which show nationalisms utility.  The first event is border clashes between 
Armenian and Azerbaijani military forces over Nagorno-Karabakh in June 2012.  The fighting 
was limited in scope but tens of soldiers on each side died.  Both sides claimed it was an armed 
incursion by the other into their territory.  I examine the speeches Aliyev gave from a month 
                                                     
37 As noted earlier, President Ilham Aliyev’s speeches are available from the official website of the president of 
Azerbaijan at http://en.president.az/news/speeches. All references to speeches come from this source. All 
translations used are the English translations provided by the website. 
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before the incident and a month after the incident looking for noticeable trends in how he uses 
nationalist themes.  These trends demonstrate my argument that Aliyev uses these nationalist 
themes when his regime needs genuine public support. 
Inclusive Language 
De Cilia et al argues that the most important aspect of nationalism is the creation of in-
groups and out-groups.  That is, defining who is and who is not part of the nation.  De Cilia 
argues that the most fundamental way these groups form is through language usage, specifically 
pronouns.  To create a sense of group solidarity pronouns like “we” and “our” are used, while to 
delineate those outside the nation, “they” is the pronoun of choice.  While this may seem like a 
minor semantic choice, it can go a long way in establishing an important sense of group 
solidarity.38 
 In terms of Aliyev’s speeches, this particular aspect of nationalism is very prevalent.  
Aliyev constantly uses the pronoun “we” in a variety of situations.  Some instances seem 
straightforward, such as “We are a hardworking nation.”  Aliyev also uses “we” in situations that 
seem somewhat stranger, such as “we will continue our economic policy.”  The first example is a 
very clear example of nationalist rhetoric, while the second example seems less so.  Even the 
second, example, however, creates a sense of solidarity between Aliyev and his audience and 
among the audience.  Obviously, not everyone in the audience is involved in economic policy 
decisions, but, by phrasing the sentiment the way he did, Aliyev creates a link between himself 
and the Azerbaijani people. 
 Aliyev follows similar patterns referring to things with the possessive pronoun “our.”  
Often he refers to things such as “Our country” or “our future” both of which have clear 
                                                     
38 1. Rudolf De Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Ruth Wodak, “The Discursive Construction of National Identities,” 
Discourse & Society 10, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 149–73. 
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nationalist connotations.  Other times, however, he will refer to something technical or mundane 
as “ours,” such as “our cement plant.”  The function is the same, however, it creates a connection 
between Aliyev, his audience, and the idea of the nation. 
 Before the June 2012 clash with Armenia, the nationalist rhetoric in Aliyev’s speeches is 
relatively subdued.  In the month before the violence, he gave six speeches to a variety of 
audiences.  His use of these themes is fairly consistent.  The most prevalent is how he uses 
pronouns to create a sense of solidarity.  In the month before the violence, Aliyev used this kind 
of inclusive language 15 to 30 times in his speeches.  After the violence began, Aliyev used this 
language much more.  In speeches after the violence, Aliyev used these pronouns 30 to 50 times 
per speech, with one speech having 101 instances of these pronouns. 
 As noted earlier, if Aliyev was using nationalism to curry public support, one would 
expect to see high levels of nationalist rhetoric before the October election and lower levels 
afterwards when there was no immediate need to generate support.  This trend is clearly visible 
when looking at Aliyev’s use of inclusive language.  Aliyev used nationalist charged language 
25 to 30 times per speech a month out from the election and 45 to 50 times per speech 
immediately before the election.   After the election in October, Aliyev’s use of this nationalist 
theme dropped to about 20 to 25 times per speech.  There was a clear spike immediately before 
the election when Aliyev needed public support the most. 
 This data shows how Aliyev used this nationalist theme to gain support in response to 
these two events.  Aliyev needed support after clashes with Armenia started in 2012, so he used 
this kind of inclusive language to create that support in the form of national solidarity.  Similarly, 
when he need the publics’ vote before the October election, he increased his usage of this kind of 
38 
 
language, while after the election, his usage went back to normal.  This data clearly shows how 
Aliyev used nationalist rhetoric to generate public support when he needed it. 
Shared Azerbaijani History 
De Cilia argues that another important aspect of nationalism is a shared history.  De Cilia 
describes this as a common set of historical memories that represent the experience of the nation.  
These memories can be ancient folklore or more recent events.  The significance of a shared 
history lies in its widespread nature.  A shared history is something that most people who could 
be said to belong to the nation can identify with.  It is usually a fairly basic and straightforward 
representation of the past, nuance is lost because it must be relatable to a large group of people.39 
 Aliyev consistently develops a shared history of the Azerbaijani nation in almost all of 
his speeches.  The shared history that he articulates is simple and universal to almost every living 
Azerbaijani citizen.  The Azerbaijani nation was oppressed by the Soviet Union for decades and 
only became independent 20 years ago.  Since independence, Azerbaijan has come a long way 
towards becoming  a modern nation.  This narrative of Azerbaijan is relatable to a large swath of 
the population because it describes relatively recent events.  This shared history also develops 
the sense of solidarity of the nation by standardizing what it means to be part of the nation.  Part 
of what it means to be Azerbaijani is to have suffered Soviet oppression and to enjoy and take 
full advantage of independence now. 
In a speech at a meeting of the council of Ministers in 2013, Aliyev invoked Azerbaijan’s 
shared history repeatedly.  At one point he remarked, “Our compatriots were driven out and 
deported not only from Nagorno-Karabakh, but also from our historical lands of Erivan, 
Zangezur and Goycha – first in the 1940-1950s and then in the 1980s.”  This statement builds a 
                                                     
39 1. Rudolf De Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Ruth Wodak, “The Discursive Construction of National Identities,” 
Discourse & Society 10, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 149–73. 
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shared history of victimhood both at the hands of the Soviet government and the Armenians.  It 
constructs a narrative of Azerbaijanis pushed out of their rightful homes by foreign enemies.  It 
is a call for solidarity lest Azerbaijan suffer similarly today. 
This nationalist theme sees a similar uptick in its usage after the violence with Armenia 
begins.  Aliyev referenced the shared history of the Azerbaijani nation once or twice in his 
speeches before the violence began.  In some speeches, he did not reference shared history at all.  
After the violence began, Aliyev brings up shared history much more consistently in his 
speeches.  There are only two speeches in which it does not come up at all and in one speech 
Aliyev references shared history seven times.  After the violence, Aliyev uses the idea of shared 
history three to four times in his speeches as opposed to roughly one time before the violence, a 
slight but noticeable increase. 
Aliyev consistently used the theme of shared history in his speeches around Aliyev’s 
election in 2013, but at very low levels, typically once or twice per speech.  This level did not 
noticeably increase as the election approached.  Despite the lack of increase in the use of this 
theme in this context, this theme also shows how Aliyev uses nationalism to generate public 
support.  When violence with Armenia began, Aliyev leaned on the idea of a shared and unique 
Azerbaijani history to unite the Azerbaijani people. 
Positive Characteristics of the Azerbaijani Nation 
Another theme consistent in Aliyev’s speeches is the various virtues of Azerbaijan and 
the Azerbaijani nation.  This is perhaps one of the most recognizable aspects of Aliyev’s 
nationalism.  Aliyev often talks about the good qualities of Azerbaijan as a state.  It is 
independent, it is stable, it is a rich state.  Many of the virtues he highlights of the Azerbaijani 
state come from the experiences of Soviet rule.  Independence and stability are important in 
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Aliyev’s nationalism because they were absent during the Soviet and immediate post-Soviet 
period.  Aliyev also highlights the virtues of the Azerbaijani people.  The Azerbaijani people are 
hardworking, capable, citizens of the world.  The characteristics he highlights of the nation itself 
have less to do with the legacy of Soviet rule directly, but many relate back to the idea of the 
independent, self-sufficient Azerbaijani citizen. 
“At the same time, Azerbaijan is a rapidly growing and modern state and it is developing 
so fast that we can create such beautiful works of architecture.”  This quote from a 2012 speech 
at a birthday celebration of Ilham’s late father shows the fundamental essence of this theme.  
Azerbaijan is modern and it is growing.  The grim days of Soviet rule are in the past and now 
Azerbaijan is modern.  This modernity means beautiful architecture is possible in Azerbaijan.  
The Azerbaijani people are members of a strong, growing, capable nation. 
 Related to this aspect of Aliyev’s nationalism is optimism about the future for 
Azerbaijan.  In his speeches, Azerbaijan is always improving.  Its economy is growing and 
diversifying, its Olympians are winning more medals, its army is getting stronger.  Azerbaijan is 
becoming more and more relevant in the world.  Aliyev’s brand of Azerbaijani nationalism is 
very forward looking.  There is a constant sense of improvement in his rhetoric.  To be 
Azerbaijani is to look toward the future for the improvement of the Azerbaijani nation. 
 After the inclusive language that subtly encourages nationalism, the most common 
nationalist theme in Aliyev’s speeches is the positive characteristics of the Azerbaijani nation.  
Before the violence with Armenia, Aliyev highlighted positive aspects of the Azerbaijani nation 
two or three times per speech.  After the violence began, it was five to seven times per speech.  
This increase represents a very clear trend in Aliyev’s nationalist rhetoric. 
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 Aliyev used the theme of praising Azerbaijani characteristics the same way around the 
time of his third presidential election.  He used this theme three to five times a speech before the 
election, but increased as the election drew nearer.  Closer to the election, Aliyev referenced this 
theme seven to nine times in his speeches and it dropped down to its pre-election levels quickly 
after the election.  In both of these events, it is clear how Aliyev uses this theme to generate 
public support when his regime needs it.  In both events, his praise of Azerbaijani virtues 
changes as expected. 
Favorable Foreign Comparisons 
Ilham Aliyev also elaborates on the out-group in his speeches.  Part of this is comparing 
Azerbaijan to the rest of the world in a positive light, pointing out how much better the 
Azerbaijani nation is than others and how much it is progressing.  This involves highlighting the 
development of Azerbaijan and contrasting it against other countries or nations.  Aliyev invokes 
the economic chaos of the former Soviet Union and Europe to show how strong the Azerbaijani 
economy is for not being chaotic.  These comparisons help build up the image of the Azerbaijani 
nation by contrasting it against others. 
In a speech at the opening of a surgical clinic at the Azerbaijan Medical University in 
2013, Aliyev remarked, “International organizations, including the World Health Organization, 
speak highly of Azerbaijan’s achievements in this sphere. Some time ago the European Office of 
the World Health Organization emphasized the reforms under way in Azerbaijan.”  This kind of 
rhetoric shows how advanced Azerbaijan is as a country.  It points out Azerbaijan’s equality in 
the international arena and also the progress made by Azerbaijan since it became independent.  It 
lauds Azerbaijanis’ virtues while also showing the progress to be had in the future. 
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 One of Aliyev’s most consistent tactics to incorporate this aspect of nationalism into his 
speeches involves pointing out Azerbaijan’s position in international ratings systems.  In 2012, 
he also pointed out that international credit rating agencies upgrade Azerbaijan’s credit rating 
when many other states were being downgraded.  Before his third presidential election in 2013, 
he often pointed out that international agencies rated Azerbaijan as improving steadily on 
fighting corruption. These things allow Aliyev to build up pride in the Azerbaijani nation by 
defining it against an inferior other nation.  Aliyev uses this theme fairly consistently in his 
speeches.  Before the violence with Armenia, in 2012 Aliyev utilized this theme two to three 
times per speech.  After the violence broke out, Aliyev’s use of this theme increased to five to 
seven times per speech. 
This trend is most clearly present when Aliyev compared Azerbaijan favorably to other 
nations before his third election.  When examining this nationalist theme, it was present in low 
levels in Aliyev’s speeches before the election.  He used it two or three times per speech a month 
away from the election.  In two speeches immediately before the election, however, he used it 12 
and 20 times.  Then after the election, its presence in his speeches quickly dropped to two or 
three times per speech.  In this case, there was a very stark contrast between in usage 
immediately before and after the election. 
Examining this nationalist theme, the reality of its use clearly lines up with the 
expectations regarding Aliyev’s need for public support.  After violence with Armenia began, 
Aliyev used this nationalist theme significantly more in his speeches.  The presidential election 
in 2013 offers a very clear example of Aliyev utilizing this nationalist theme to generate support.  
Immediately before the election, he hammered home the point of Azerbaijani’s positive 
international position and then after the election, he rarely mentions this theme in his speeches. 
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Legacy of Heydar Aliyev and the Threat of Armenia 
The legacy of Heydar Aliyev also features heavily in Ilham Aliyev’s nationalist rhetoric.  
In his speeches, Heydar Aliyev is an almost mythical figure who brought Azerbaijan out of the 
chaos of the Soviet collapse.  He is almost the father of the modern Azerbaijani state.  Ilham 
invokes his father’s legacy to justify the course the country is on as a continuation of that legacy.  
Ilham even refers to his father as the great leader or “our great leader.” 
 Ilham’s description of his father in these terms has two functions.  First, it makes Heydar 
Aliyev part of the shared history of the Azerbaijani nation.  He becomes a symbol of the nation.  
His policies led to the stability and upward trajectory of the nation.  Heydar binds the 
Azerbaijani nation together as much as the flag or the national anthem.  Second, by talking about 
Heydar in these terms and claiming to be a continuation of his policies, Ilham transfers that 
significance to himself and his regime.  His regime is more legitimate because of its relation to 
Heydar’s regime. 
Another aspect of this “in-group out-group” formulation in Aliyev’s speeches is the 
presence of Armenia as an existential threat to the Azerbaijani nation.  Aliyev often references 
foreign threats to Azerbaijan and Armenia is most the constant and menacing threat.  Armenia 
especially constitutes the most out of all out-groups.  The threat of Armenia helps define the 
Azerbaijani nation by giving it something against which to measure itself. 
 The theme of the Armenia threat is common in Aliyev’s speeches.  It typically takes the 
form of Armenia’s role in Nagorno-Karabakh.  “The illegal Armenia occupation of our lands” is 
a typical formulation found in almost all of Aliyev speeches. Aliyev also references the 
international community siding with Azerbaijan against Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.  The 
superiority of Azerbaijan to Armenia in almost every respect is another constant refrain in 
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Aliyev’s speeches.   In reference to economics, military strength, demographics, Aliyev espouses 
the strength of the Azerbaijani nation and the weakness of the Armenian nation.  References to 
other foreign threats to Armenia usually come in the form of vague conspiracies directed against 
Azerbaijan by unnamed foreign actors. 
 These final two nationalist themes, the legacy of Heydar Aliyev and the threat of 
Armenia feature less consistently in Aliyev’s speeches.  Their use is more contextual and it is 
more difficult to pick out definite trends in their use.  This is surprising in the case of the 
Armenia threat considering that there was actual violence occurring in 2012.  Aliyev does 
mention the Armenia threat and even does so eleven times in one speech after the violence with 
Armenia occurred, but the use of this nationalist theme was much less consistent.  Aliyev 
referenced the legacy of his father in many speeches, but there is also no clear trend.  These two 
nationalist themes are significant in Aliyev’s nationalist rhetoric.  These are powerful nationalist 
themes, but their use is more context dependent than the other themes.  Aliyev seems to pick and 
choose which audiences he uses these themes for and as such there are no clear trends in their 
use as with the other themes. 
Conclusions from Data 
 To answer the question of why Ilham Aliyev devotes so much effort to developing 
nationalist themes in his speeches, I argue that doing so allows Aliyev to generate public support 
for his regime, despite the assumption that leader in hybrid states do not necessarily need 
widespread public support.  I analyzed Aliyev’s speeches looking for six nationalist themes, 
inclusive language, positive aspects of the Azerbaijani nation, shared Azerbaijani history, 
favorable foreign comparisons, the legacy of Heydar Aliyev, and the threat of Armenia.  I 
focused my analysis around two events, 2012 border violence with Armenia and Aliyev’s 2013 
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presidential election.  According to my argument, Aliyev’s use of these themes should change 
depending on the situation in terms of when he needs public support.  Aliyev should court public 
support more after violence with Armenia began and before his presidential election. 
Examining Aliyev’s speeches in the months before, during, and after the 2012 border 
clashes with Armenia, a clear trend emerges.  In four of the six nationalist themes being 
analyzed, usage increased after the violence began.  Aliyev responded to the violence by 
increasing the nationalist content of his speeches.  In the other two nationalist themes, there were 
no clear trends, their use tended to depend on the nature of the speech being given and its 
audience.  What is clear, however, is that Aliyev’s use of nationalist themes did respond as 
expected to the violence with Armenia. 
As with the case of the 2012 violence with Armenia, there appears to be a clear trend 
regarding these nationalist themes.  In three of the nationalist trends studied, Aliyev appeared to 
modulate their usage relative to the presidential election.  As the election drew closer, Aliyev 
ramped up his nationalist rhetoric in order to gain more public support.  After the election, his 
use of these nationalist themes returned to their pre-election levels.  This trend was very clear in 
the data regarding inclusive language, Azerbaijani positive characteristics, and favorable foreign 
comparisons.  The trend was less clear in the other three nationalist themes studied, but overall, 
one can clearly see Aliyev utilizing these nationalist themes in response to the 2013 presidential 
election in a predictable manner. 
 The data presented here shows that, in general, Aliyev’s use of nationalist themes aligns 
with expectations based on my argument.  Aliyev ramps up his use of nationalism after violence 
with Armenia begins.  His nationalist rhetoric is relatively dormant before the presidential 
election in 2013, but picks up dramatically immediately before the election.  Afterwards, his use 
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of nationalist themes returns to its low pre-election levels.  By examining these nationalist 
themes in Aliyev’s speeches, it is clear that he uses these themes to generate public support when 
he needs it. 
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CONCLUSION 
 In this thesis, I examined the question why would a leader in a hybrid regime spend time 
developing nationalist themes in their speeches.  I focused on Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan to 
examine this occurrence.  Azerbaijan fits the bill of hybrid regime with its mixture of some 
democratic and some authoritarian elements and nationalism features heavily in the speeches of 
Ilham Aliyev.  I argued that Aliyev used nationalist themes in his speeches in order to gain 
public legitimacy for his regime. 
 This nationalist rhetoric functions similarly in Aliyev’s regime as it would in a more fully 
democratic regime.  In both cases, leaders employ nationalist rhetoric in order to gain genuine 
support from the population.  The key difference is that the votes that population casts matter 
more in one regime than the other.  Seen in this way, Aliyev’s nationalist rhetoric is one of the 
more democratic aspects of this hybrid regime. 
 I showed this using the practice of content analysis, which is a methodological technique 
that allows one to discern trends in qualitative data.  I coded Aliyev’s speeches for six nationalist 
themes that I determined to be significant based on theories of nationalism and the context of 
Azerbaijan, inclusive language, shared history, positive characteristics of the Azerbaijani nation, 
favorable foreign comparisons, the legacy of Heydar Aliyev, and the threat of Armenia.  These 
themes came out of the literature on nationalism which suggested several core components of 
nationalist ideology.  I used this theoretical framework to develop these six themes based on the 
rhetoric of Ilham Aliyev. 
48 
 
 There are many different ways to employ content analysis and, for this project, I coded 
speeches for occurrences of these nationalist themes and examined how the frequency of these 
nationalist themes changed.  I focused on speeches centered around two recent events in 
Azerbaijan to show the utility of Aliyev’s nationalist rhetoric, the 2012 border violence with 
Armenia and Aliyev’s third presidential election is 2013.  These events provided a frame of 
reference for analyzing Aliyev’s speeches against theoretical expectations based on the idea of 
regime legitimacy, 
 If Aliyev does use these nationalist themes to gain legitimacy for his regime, it would be 
expected that his usage in his speeches would reflect his regime’s need for legitimacy.  After the 
2012 violence with Armenia, Aliyev would need support for his regime in a time of crisis more 
than he would before the violence started.  With regards to his election in 2013, Aliyev would 
need public legitimacy before the election, but be less concerned with it immediately after the 
election.  These expectations allowed me to test the idea that Aliyev used nationalist themes to 
gain public legitimacy. 
 The data gleaned from Aliyev’s speeches through the techniques of content analysis 
supported the idea that nationalism helped Aliyev generate public support.  The trends present in 
Aliyev’s speeches matched the expectations set out here across many of the nationalist themes.  
Before the violence with Armenia in 2012, Aliyev’s speeches contained some nationalist 
rhetoric, but after the violence started, his nationalist rhetoric increased dramatically.  Similarly, 
a month away from his 2013 election, Aliyev’s speeches contained a low level of these 
nationalist themes.  As the election drew closer, this level increased markedly and then decreased 
again once the election passed.  The data showed clear trends in when Aliyev chose to use 
nationalist rhetoric that support the idea that he uses nationalism to gain public legitimacy. 
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 One of the most interesting findings involved nationalist themes that did not see their 
usage increase in predictable ways.  Aliyev did not employ the threat of Armenia as a nationalist 
theme more in the aftermath of violence with Armenia in 2012, which is a strange departure 
from what one would expect.  There is no clear reason for why Aliyev chose not to use this 
theme more after violence with Armenia started, but it does suggest that perhaps there is more 
nuance to the use of these themes.  Perhaps this particular theme responded to different events or 
Aliyev used it under different circumstances. 
 This data shed light on the complexities of politics in hybrid regimes.  Most scholarship 
focuses on the structural aspects of hybrid regimes and how such regimes are vulnerable to 
democratic transition.  This focus misses out on how democratic institutions can function even in 
their weakened state in a hybrid regime.  Aliyev’s use of nationalism in his speeches suggests he 
still cares about creating a base of support in the population.  His concern with the population’s 
feelings is significant because it suggests the complex nature of how hybrid regimes function. 
 This research represents a compelling starting point for more scholarship.  Aliyev’s 
speeches are only one way the Azerbaijani state could utilize nationalism to gain popular 
legitimacy.  Other state actions may also show how nationalism can be used to gain popular 
legitimacy.  Nationalism also is not the only tool that Aliyev and the Azerbaijani state could use 
to generate public support.  Other methods could work in the same way as nationalism in this 
case.  More research can further illuminate how hybrid regimes build public legitimacy and what 
this means in terms of their function and durability. 
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